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When he was elected in 2008, President Barack Obama went to great lengths to convince voters and the rest of the world that he would not continue many of the foreign policies of George W. Bush. Bush’s presidency is most remembered for the war in Iraq, a campaign that cost thousands of American lives and destabilized the Middle East. However, while the war in Iraq dominated the headlines, the prospects of a nuclear Iran also loomed over the region. In 2002, Iranian dissidents revealed that the Islamic Republic was pursuing a covert nuclear program. Since that time, the United States and its European partners, as well as China, have worked to contain the country’s nuclear ambitions, imposing sanctions to force the Iranian government to the negotiating table. In 2013, Iran agreed to an interim accord that saw it agree to restrictions on its nuclear program in return for some sanction relief. The United States hopes to have an agreement with Iran by June, thereby averting military action and possibly beginning the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
This topic brief will discuss recent steps toward finalizing a nuclear deal with Iran, the domestic politics and controversies surrounding such a deal, and how a closer U.S.-Iranian relationship may alter the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. Extempers are encouraged to read last season’s topic brief on the Iranian nuclear accord in order to understand more of the background of U.S.-Iranian relations.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Finalizing a Nuclear Deal
Since 2002, the United States and its international allies (Great Britain, Germany, France, China, and Russia – the so-called P5+1) have tried to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The Islamic Republic of Iran argues that its nuclear activities are purely peaceful, saying that it is building a nuclear program for energy, as well as for medical and scientific reasons. Critics of Iran’s program say that it is attempting to become a nuclear power so as to enhance its defenses and reinforce its position in the Middle East relative to other non-nuclear governments such as Saudi Arabia. They also note that if Iran’s program was simply peaceful – after all, peaceful enrichment of uranium is allowed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – that its government would not have tried to keep it a secret.
The United States and Iran have had a very difficult and complicated relationship since 1979 when a popular uprising deposed Shah Reza and an Islamic Republic was proclaimed under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The taking of fifty-two American hostages and the American embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 produced a severing of diplomatic relations and played a significant role in the failed re-election campaign of President Jimmy Carter the following year. The United States backed Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, but failed to topple the regime. Some thought that after the takeover of Iraq in 2003 that Iran would be the next target, but American operations became bogged down in the Iraqi occupation – somewhat because of Iran’s funneling of aid and weapons to Shi’ite militias that clashed with American forces.
Prior to 2013, the United States and Iran had very few channels of open communication regarding the country’s nuclear program. The United States and its allies imposed crippling oil and financial sanctions on the regime, which were done in part to restrain Israeli ambitions to unilaterally attack Iran. Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was also a vocal critic of the United States, arguing that Iran had a right to enrich uranium and questioning the idea that al-Qaeda was behind the September 11 terrorist attacks. Ahmadinejad also complicated negotiation efforts by make hostile statements about Israel, with one mistranslated comment saying that he wished to “wipe Israel off the face of the map.” The election of moderate Hassan Rouhani as president in 2013 paved the way for better relations, as he spoke in favor of negotiations as a way to reduce the sanctions hurting Iran’s economy (where youth unemployment is at alarmingly high levels) and providing greater protections of human rights. Rouhani’s outreach to the West paid off in November 2013 when both sides reached an agreement called the Joint Plan of Action. The Los Angeles Times explains on March 16 that this agreement saw Iran vow to eliminate its uranium stockpile that contained 20% fissionable material, which could be enriched to weapons-grade uranium, set a cap on the amount of enriched uranium Iran could keep to 3.5%, and the agreement lifted some sanctions in return for daily monitoring of Iranian nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Joint Action Plan was only supposed to last for six months, but negotiators have extended that deal through June 30, 2015.
Last week, Western and Iranian negotiators met in Switzerland to hammer out the outlines of what a final agreement in June would look like. The Huffington Post reports on March 18 that U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and Iranian atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi met last Wednesday in the Swiss city of Lausanne to look over the technical details that a deal would entail, with Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif later entering the talks. Iranian sources said that both sides were done with 90% of the accord, but Reuters reported on March 19 that Western sources refuted that claim, saying that both sides were still far apart on several major issues. These include how long an agreement will be in effect, how many centrifuges Iran will be allowed to operate, and how early sanction relief from Western governments will go into effect.
On the timing of the accord, there is disagreement between the two sides about how long an agreement should last. Reuters explains that France has proposed a fifteen year limit on Iran’s nuclear activities, which would then be followed by a decade of monitoring by the IAEA. The United States has proposed a ten-year moratorium on Iran’s nuclear program, while Iran is pushing for less than ten years. During the moratorium, sanctions would gradually be lifted on Iran’s economy, which would be aligned with patterns of good behavior. The Iranian government is not a fan of this, though, as they want sanctions to be lifted very quickly after a deal is completed. As with most negotiations, the timing of the accord, as well as the speed with which sanctions are lifted, boil down to the issue of trust. The West is demanding that Iran show it is acting in good faith, while the Iranian government does not want to sign an accord that still makes it dependent on the West for sanction relief. However, a likely deal will probably see a ten-year moratorium as that is between what Iran’s leaders want and what French negotiators are seeking. Also, sanctions relief will probably go in stages because if the West lifted sanctions on Iran too quickly it would completely lose its leverage.
Regarding centrifuges, The Boston Herald reports on March 21 that the United States is likely to limit Iran to 6,500 centrifuges and push to keep these away from more advanced machines. Allowing Iran to keep thousands of centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium, goes beyond initial American efforts to limit the country’s nuclear program as the original American aim was to only let Iran have a few hundred centrifuges. The Los Angeles Times article previously cited explains that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu criticized America’s shifting stance on the centrifuge issue when he addressed Congress on March 3. American negotiators defend the changing position on Iranian centrifuges by arguing that Iran has agreed to restrict how centrifuges are configured in cascades in order to reduce how much enriched uranium they can produce, thereby justifying the allowance of more centrifuges.
The Obama administration is hoping that it can acquire some type of written agreement with Iran by the end of March, but Iran is seemingly only interested in a long-term deal that can be signed in June. Iranian negotiators show little appetite for committing themselves to another interim agreement. Instead, they want a lasting agreement with the P5+1 to settle the nuclear issue for good.
Domestic Political Concerns About Warming U.S.-Iranian Relations
Americans hold conflicting attitudes about Iran and the ongoing negotiations pursued by President Obama. According to CNN on March 17, a recent poll shows that 68% of Americans support negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, with 77% of Democrats supporting the negotiations, as well as 65% of Republicans. 64% of independents also favor a diplomatic option. However, it should be noted that this poll refers to the vague idea of negotiations and did not poll voters on what a specific deal with Iran might entail. In other words, American might like the idea of negotiating with Iran, but once specifics of a deal are released their opinions could sour. A great parallel for this is the Affordable Care Act, as polls show that Americans generally support the idea of universal health insurance, but when they are questioned about some of its effects or costs levels of support decline. In addition, the Pew Research Center finds on March 18 that 76% of Americans told pollsters last spring that they had an unfavorable view of Iran. In fact, 16% of Americans said Iran was the greatest threat to American national security, ranking the country third behind Russia (23%) and China (19%). Also, in 2013 pollsters found that 93% of Americans opposed Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, with 64%saying that armed force would be an acceptable solution to preventing the Islamic Republic from obtaining nuclear capability. Lastly, Americans are very skeptical that the current talks will even do any good, with The Los Angeles Times explaining that a recent Wall Street Journal-NBC poll taken on March 9 showed that 71% of Americans doubted that a deal would prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb.
President Obama’s decision to engage Iran in negotiations has encountered some bipartisan opposition in Congress. Aside from Republicans, Democratic senators such as Robert Menendez of New Jersey, Bob Casey of Pennsylvania, and Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut have been skeptical of President Obama’s foreign policy toward Iran. Reuters notes on March 15 that Virginia Democrat Tim Kaine has been critical of President Obama as well, especially the President’s argument that any agreement brokered with Iran will be an “executive agreement” and will thus not have to be ratified by the Senate. Senators such as Kaine argue that since an Iranian nuclear deal will in some way involve the lifting of American sanctions on Iran, a power that is given to the legislative branch, that the President would be violating the separation of powers.
Republicans have been very critical of the President’s decision to engage Iran in negotiations, arguing that the U.S. is turning its back on valuable Middle Eastern allies such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, none of whom want Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. Two weeks ago forty-seven Republican senators issued an open letter to the Iranian government. This letter, according to The Business Insider on March 14, said that any agreement that President Obama brokers with Iran might be modified in the future, especially if that agreement is made without the consent of Congress. Reuters explains on March 11 that Secretary of State Kerry responded with “utter disbelief” when hearing of the letter, which he and the Obama administration view as an action designed to scuttle negotiations. The President’s supporters also argue that the letter encroaches upon a president’s foreign policy powers, which include treaty negotiations. The CNN poll previously cited found that 49% of Americans said that Senate Republicans went too far in sending the letter, but only 39% believe it will actually hurt the ongoing negotiations (32% did say that the letter may harm nuclear efforts). Republicans are also taking a hit in Congress over the letter, as Politico writes on March 11 that Senator Casey and Senator Blumenthal were angry that the letter took on a partisan tone and that their opinions were not solicited. The letter’s partisan tone may also scuttle attempts at building a bipartisan coalition to oppose the President. Thus far, it does not appear that the Iranian government is withdrawing from negotiations over the letter, but some senior officials have said that the letter is providing doubts within the Iranian government over whether a lasting deal can be struck. Slate on March 11 created a satirical Iranian response to the Republican letter, which I encourage extempers to cut for their files as a possible attention getting device (AGD).
Foreign Policy reports on March 17 that some Republicans such as Senator Marco Rubio of Florida and Mark Kirk of Illinois have also attacked outreach to Iran on human rights grounds. The argument they make is one reiterated by House Republicans such as Chris Smith of New Jersey and Ileana Ros-Lehtien of Florida that Iran’s poor human rights record shows that it cannot be trusted. For example, Rouhani was elected as a reformer in 2013, but the United Nations found in a report last month that two-thirds of Iranian women are victims of domestic violence and 50,000 Iranian girls are married before the age of fifteen. In addition, the United Nations has documented the lack of due process protections in Iranian courts and the use of torture in Iranian prisons. Republican human rights arguments have found a sympathetic ear among other human rights advocates as well, as they fear a deal with Iran will lend legitimacy to its government and thereby allow it to continue oppressing its people. Foreign Policy argues that a great example of this phenomenon is the People’s Republic of China as the country was allowed into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 and has not yet substantially improved its human rights record.
The Guardian of March 19 explains that Congress has been working for months to demand a greater role in the Iranian negotiations. House and Senate panels, led by Republicans, are demanding that a vote be held if the President reaches a deal with Iran. Senator Bob Corker (R-TN), who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is pushing for a bill that would demand such a vote. Also, Congress is looking into ways to increase sanctions against Iran. While President Obama could veto the bills that come out of these efforts, the Iranian government could use American domestic turmoil as a reason to walk away, arguing that if the President cannot solicit congressional approval across party lines that a future agreement will not hold. This is especially true because even if Congress does not have to approve of a final agreement, they will have to lift some of the sanctions imposed on the Iranian economy as some are outside of the reach of executive action or other parts of the federal bureaucracy. The Wall Street Journal went as far as to say on March 18 that an Iranian agreement will be “ObamaCare for Arms Control,” as the President has failed to line up adequate political support to defend his diplomatic effort and that it will unravel as the public learns more about it.
Changing the Geopolitical Situation in the Middle East
One could argue that Iran has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the war on terrorism. American-led efforts toppled the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001, a government that Iran did not care for. Also, the United States eliminated Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, who had served as a check on Iranian influence in the region. American troubles in occupying Iraq also enabled Iran to expand its influence there among the country’s Shi’ite majority, and Iran has funneled money to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Iran has also benefitted from the rise of the Islamic State, as the Iraqi government has come to depend on Iranian aid, and Iranian assistance to Hezbollah has helped Syrian President Bashar al-Assad keep power in the face of domestic resistance. American efforts against the Islamic State, a Sunni outfit, has also drawn it closer to Iran, a Shi’ite nation, despite the fact that both countries are still diplomatically estranged. The Spectator, a British conservative magazine, writes on March 21 that current American efforts against ISIS are aligning it with Shi’ite militias backed by Iran such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (translated as “League of the Righteous”). This group was responsible for roadside bombs that killed American soldiers in the occupation of Iraq, but the United States is putting aside that issue in order to bolster the fortunes of the Iraqi government. The New York Times explains on March 16 that Iran is one of the primary reasons the Iraqi government remains afloat as it has sent advanced rockets and missiles to the country to fight ISIS and that two-thirds of Iraq’s 30,000 troops are Shia militia units trained and equipped by the Islamic Republic.
Critics of President Obama argue that he is endorsing Iranian hegemony in the region and biasing United States policy toward Shi’ite nations. For example, there were fears that if the United States got involved in the Syrian civil war in the fall of 2013 that it would have become a de facto Shi’ite air force. The Straits Times of Malaysia writes on March 19 that the countries that surround Iran, especially Gulf states, are not keen on a nuclear accord. It argues that President Obama, in his drive for a deal, has ignored building the support of American allies such as Saudi Arabia. While the President’s defenders argue that the President flew to Saudi Arabia in January following the death of King Abdullah, those gestures are not reassuring Sunni nations who see the United States negotiating with Iran in secret (something they were told was not taking place) and backing off some of its initial demands for Iran’s nuclear program (for example on the centrifuge issue or even the fact that Iran will be able to have some nuclear capacity instead of none at all). Sunni nations might also be alarmed, as The Hill explains on March 17, by the recent United States Worldwide Threat Assessment that did not mention Iran or Hezbollah as terror threats. One of the fears about an Iranian nuclear accord is that if Iran is allowed to retain elements of its nuclear program that other Sunni nations in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, will begin pursuing their own programs. This would start a nuclear arms race in arguably the world’s most volatile region. The White House hopes that this will not occur by offering firm security guarantees, but it is already evident that Sunni nations are becoming very wary of America’s warming relations with Iran.
Foreign policy can also make strange bedfellows and this is definitely true of how Israel factors into the ongoing negotiations. The White House cannot be happy that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emerged victorious in the recent Israeli parliamentary elections, and Politico writes on March 18 that President Obama may move to no longer shield Israel from United Nations actions against it for settlement building or refusing to return to 1967 borders. However, Politico also explains that the White House is reluctant to eliminate military support for Israel, which is likely tied into Israel’s role as an undeclared nuclear power. As William B. Quandt’s book Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 explains, American presidents since the late 1960s have hoped that American military aid can keep Israel from resorting to its nuclear deterrent. If American aid was significantly curtailed, Israel might be tempted to resort to its nuclear weapons as a final option if the withdrawal of American aid invited Arab attack. Nevertheless, that assumes Arab nations would unite against Israel and there are signs that its ties with Sunni nations such as Saudi Arabia are improving as those nations deem a nuclear Iran as a more substantial threat to their interests. Foreign Policy provides an excellent set of scenarios for how a successful and failed Iranian nuclear accord may affect the Middle East in an article on March 16. One of those scenarios foresees Israel working in partnership with Gulf states such as Jordan and Egypt to sanction Iran and possibly participate in a joint military attack. This might sound far-fetched, but reports have been released for years that Saudi Arabia and Israel have acquired much of the same mind about Iran’s nuclear aims. A joint Israeli-Sunni effort against Iran would probably mandate that Israel provide some concessions to Palestinians for statehood so that Sunni governments could sell such a partnership to their populations, but if this scenario played out, the United States would have its influence severely curtailed in the region. Israel would be in a much more secure situation and no longer so reliant on U.S. assistance, Sunni nations would be less interested in working with the United States that backed a political and religious enemy, and the settling of much of the Israeli-Palestinian issue would make America’s assumed peacemaking role obsolete. Therefore, one of the outcomes of warmer U.S.-Iranian relations might be less U.S. influence over Israel and Sunni nations in the region as they grow skeptical of American priorities.
With negotiations continuing to proceed over Iran’s nuclear program, extempers should continue to follow the issue closely. The deadline for a deal, barring another extension, is June 30 and this shortly after the National Speech and Debate Association (NSDA) National Tournament. If you are attending that tournament – and I hope you are – you will want to have a good Iran file because I can guarantee that you will run into a question about it or a question where that information can be used. Warming relations between the U.S. and Iran have the potential to reshape the Middle East, but that process could still invite more instability if Sunni states shake off American influence, U.S.-Israeli ties worsen, and Iran is given the ability to possibly create and possess a nuclear weapon in subsequent decades.