Extempers who are juniors or seniors this year might remember the protests that threatened the ruling government of Myanmar, a country also referred to as Burma by much of the international community, in the fall of 2007. These protests, led by monks and political dissidents of Myanmar’s military junta, were in response to the junta removing fuel subsidies but eventually acquired a more democratic flavor. However, this so-called Saffron Revolution was quelled by the beating, imprisonment, and killing of its participants and thus, Myanmar’s second attempt at acquiring a democratic government since 1962 failed.
At a time when globalization has brought a degree of prosperity to the Southeast Asian region and as countries in that region, such as Indonesia, are playing a more prominent role in global affairs, Myanmar’s junta sticks out like a sore thumb. The junta proclaims that its autocratic governance is justified in order to keep Myanmar’s multi-faceted ethnic groups together under one umbrella. However, the junta has used its position and Myanmar’s plethora of natural resources, to enrich and protect itself. This style of governing has turned what was once Southeast Asia’s richest country (during the British colonial period) to one of the region’s most impoverished.
The urgency of this brief is in Senator Jim Webb’s (D-Virginia) recent visit to Myanmar. During this visit, Webb met with the head of the junta, General Than Shwe, and the country’s most vocal democrat, Aung San Suu Kyi. Webb’s visit has brought back some international attention to events that are unfolding in Myanmar. This, coupled with the State Department’s concern about Myanmar’s military ambitions and alliances, makes the country a hot topic that extempers may encounter in the early part of this year.
This brief will provide some background concerning the historical tensions in Myanmar, the circumstances surrounding Webb’s visit, and discuss strategies for the international community to better engage Myanmar.
Democratic Background
In the 1820s, the British government successfully made Myanmar, then known as Burma, a British colony, deposing the Buddhist monarchy that had once governed the fragile nation. The British brought Western ideas of education and governance to the country and much like Napoleon’s actions in the two decades prior to this in Europe, these ideas (such as nationalism) would eventually lead to the downfall of British colonial rule in the 20th century. During their time in power, the British played up Burma’s ethnic tensions, favoring the Karen minority group in the country’s south and using them in the military. This group of Karen soldiers, also referred to as the “Karen rifles” were used to crush rebellions and it earned them the disdain of the Burmese majority. Other ethnic groups, such as the Chin and Kachin, also allied with the British against the Burmese majority.
World War II saw the Japanese initially support the cause of Burmese nationalism and they aided the Burmese in a rebellion against the British and their ethnic allies. However, near the end of the war the Burmese switched sides, tiring of Japanese interference and occupation by its troops. Burmese military leader Aung San most likely made a political calculation as well, as he knew that the Japanese were going to lose the war and siding with the British would probably guarantee a strong Burmese voice when independence came. The British granted independence to Burma in January 1948 after a strong debate in the House of Commons, where former prime minister Winston Churchill argued that Burma was not ready to be independent and that the country would soon implode into ethnic conflict.
Churchill’s words were correct. Burma’s attempts at installing a democratic government between 1948-1962 failed miserably. The central government was ill equipped to handle the rebuilding of the war torn country and it failed to quell ethnic suspicions in the country. During this time, the Karen people launched a fight for independence, which continues to this day (and was discussed in the latest installment of Rambo). A failure to quell these conflicts led General Ne Win to launch a coup in 1962 and seize control of the country. The military quickly imposed its will over the country’s economy, weakening many institutions, such as agriculture through incompetent policies and corruption. Ne Win’s rule and that of the military was solidified in a 1974 constitution. Ne Win would rule until 1988.
It was here that Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San (who was assassinated five months prior to the country’s independence in 1947) and who had worked at the United Nations and studied abroad in the United States and London, burst onto the scene. In 1988, economic mismanagement and political oppression led to protests against the government and Suu Kyi, who had returned to Burma to care for her mother, demanded a democratic government. Using her clout as Aung San’s daughter, Suu Kyi became the general secretary of the National League for Democracy (NLD), which became the biggest opponent to the military regime.
Faced with more protests and several internal shakeups, the military agreed to hold elections for the first time since the military had taken power. However, these elections were hardly set up and contested fairly. The military restricted opposition campaigning, placed Suu Kyi under house arrest prior to the vote, tried to intimidate voters, and used its domination of the media to try to win support for its candidates. It was also in this environment in 1989 that the military generals renamed the country Myanmar because it better included all of the nation’s ethnic groups instead of just the Burmese people. Despite these moves, the NLD still crushed the military’s candidates in the 1990 election, winning 392 of 492 seats in parliament. Faced with the prospect of losing their power and possibly being prosecuted for crimes, military leaders refused to recognize the result of the election and held onto power, crushing dissent with ruthless force.
When General Than Shwe took over in 1992, the country’s generals went about engaging parts of the international community despite its internal problems. The military under Shwe is noted for its ceasefire agreements with most of the ethnic groups in the country (the Karens are the exception) and for getting the country into the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997. Shwe also pushed through Myanmar’s third constitution in 2008 that reserves a large part of the national parliament for military leaders. It also prevents Suu Kyi from ever becoming president because she married a British national and the new constitution bars a president from serving if they have married a foreigner.
However, in the midst of these successes, Shwe has also played a role in the war crimes in Karen-held regions, where the government has forcibly moved residents to have access to the natural resources in their area. It also reportedly tortured, raped, and executed people in rebel zones. Human rights groups have accused the junta of killing over 3,000 ethnic villagers in the last decade and of causing two million to be displaced by its policies. The government has also not lightened restrictions on the media or in politics, as its reaction to the 2007 protests demonstrates, and it has not improved its economic or social management, as seen in its bungled response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 which resulted in the deaths of 140,000 people.
Webb’s Visit
Senator Jim Webb, a Democrat from Virginia who was rumored as a vice-presidential pick for President Obama in the 2008 campaign, recently made a visit to Myanmar and met with Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi. Having access to Suu Kyi was significant because when UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon visited in early July he was denied visiting her. Webb is a critic of U.S. policy on Myanmar, which is heavily reliant on sanctions. The Christian Science Monitor last week also said that Webb has strong ties to the region, having fought in the Vietnam War and being the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
Webb’s visit came on the heels of the military junta keeping Suu Kyi in house arrest for eighteen months after the terms of her house arrest were violated by Vietnam veteran John Yettaw, who swam to Suu Kyi’s residence to visit her. Why exactly Yettaw visited Suu Kyi is uncertain, with some saying he did so because he wanted to covert her to Mormonism. Others say Yettaw visited because he had developed an obsession with Suu Kyi while in Thailand. Needless to say, his visit to Suu Kyi, which Yettaw had evidently done before in 2008 undetected, was illegal as she is not allowed any visitors. Suu Kyi was imprisoned and put on trial for this violation and was sentenced to three years hard labor, a sentence the junta eventually commuted. Conspirators allege that the junta used Yettaw’s visit as a way to keep Suu Kyi in house arrest so that she could not be in public for the 2010 elections, which will be the first elections held under the new constitution the junta ushered through in 2008.
For his part in violating Suu Kyi’s house arrest, Yettaw was sentenced to seven years hard labor. Yettaw’s medical state was hardly stable when he entered Burma, being an epileptic and a diabetic. Yettaw is also bipolar. While imprisoned before trial, he suffered seizures and there were concerns that he would not live long in one of the country’s prisons. While visiting with the junta, Webb was able to secure Yettaw’s release, which was expected since the junta did not want the bad press of Yettaw dying in their custody.
It is unclear whether Webb will be able to shift American policy on Myanmar. However, his meeting and his access to Suu Kyi shows that there might be openings for the American government to reconsider its policies towards Myanmar. After all, Suu Kyi has said herself that she is open to sanctions being dropped against the junta under certain conditions.
Rethinking Myanmar Policy
Since the sham of elections in 1990, the international community has isolated Myanmar. The United States currently bans investment in the country by citizens and American corporations; although the caveat of this is that the investment cannot be new. This allows the American oil company Unocal to continue to operate in Myanmar because they had contracts with the regime prior to that sanction being implemented in 1997. Furthermore, the government has import restrictions that bar Myanmar’s goods from entering U.S. territory. Finally, because of the junta’s inability to stop opium production in the Myanmar’s part of the Golden Triangle, an opium and heroin producing network that includes Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, the government has been designated by the U.S. to be drug producing nation and that restricts a lot of foreign aid from coming into the country.
The intent of these sanctions was the same as those that were placed on Cuba when Fidel Castro took over. The idea was that if sanctions were enacted that the regime would eventually either cave in and a new government would take its place or that it would see how its actions were bad and change internally. However, as with Cuba, neither of these has taken place. The sanctions have hurt the people of Myanmar more than the junta, who profits from the country’s natural resources. Also, the sanctions have caused the NLD to be criticized by people in Myanmar, who argue that they need to withdraw their support for the sanctions because they are hurting more than they are helping. This impedes the chances of the democracy movement gaining steam in the country. Additionally, the junta has had to reach out to less friendly countries for cooperation because they cannot access the West. Myanmar has reportedly had dealing with North Korea and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton raised the alarm over the summer that the junta may be in the process of developing a nuclear weapons program. Finally, the sanctions are being circumvented by Myanmar’s neighbors, notably China, Thailand, India, and Russia who want access to Myanmar’s stashes of fine wood, oil, natural gas, and precious stones. China and Russia also give the junta cover at the UN Security Council and prevent any UN resolutions from passing that are highly critical of it. ASEAN also has a doctrine of non-interference in other countries affairs and the leaders of the body have been loath to criticize Myanmar publicly, although they have done so in extreme events such as the political unrest in 2007. With these arguments, critics say that the United States is accomplishing little in its foreign policy with Myanmar and that it is now time to engage the generals and try to get them into the fold with Western nations as opposed to China and Russia and lure them away from dealing with rogue states like North Korea.
Nevertheless, even considering how sanctions have not worked, the U.S. is in a tricky situation. Although the Obama administration has not shown a significant emphasis on human rights thus far in foreign policy, it would not look favorable in the eyes of human rights activists for the U.S. to be working hand in hand with the junta. It might also revive images of the Cold War years where the U.S. allied with dictators in Latin America, Asia, and Africa in order to keep them from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. This has been America’s de facto policy with Egypt in the Middle East, not because of the Soviet threat, but because we need them to broker a future Israeli-Palestinian peace. Also, withdrawing from its sanctions policy would mean that the American government was wrong on the topic, which would be a major public relations coup for the junta and may embolden it to take even harsher actions.
Observers speculate that the United States might be able to win some concessions from the junta if sanctions were to be lifted. The lifting of sanctions could accompany fewer restrictions on the media and possibly Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest. The lifting of sanctions might also accompany the loosening of restrictions on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or community organizations, which are non-existent across the country as national law bars organizations with five or more people. One consideration that has to be made when lifting these sanctions is that the junta will never allow a true democracy to flourish. The reason is that if free elections were held, the junta would most likely lose and it has vested economic interests that could be investigated and destroyed. Junta leaders also worry about being arrested and tried for war crimes. These fears are legitimate, the junta have see what happened to Slobodan Milosevic, Charles Taylor, and Saddam Hussein, and must be weighed in any speech or decision-making calculus on Myanmar.
There are those that do not want sanctions to be lifted in any way and actually want them to be tighter. Some have argued for the U.S. government to use its powers under the Patriot Act to clamp down on financial transactions made by the junta’s leaders and to install penalties on the country’s financial institutions. Others want tighter travel sanctions, but again, without a broad-based core of support the junta’s leaders will still have wiggle room out of these tight spots.
Clearly a new American policy is needed, yet balancing that policy with America’s foreign policy image and the commitment it has made over the years to Myanmar’s democrats is not easy. In the end, it may be up to Suu Kyi what happens with U.S. policy on Myanmar. If she was willing to have some sanctions lifted, the U.S. government may oblige. Yet it is hard to fathom the U.S. ever lifting the sanctions on the junta as long as a truly democratic government appears to be a fairy tale in Myanmar.