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For the last fifty years the Colombian government has been fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist outfit. The conflict has claimed 220,000 lives, displaced an estimated five million people, and harmed Colombia’s international image. Under former President Alvaro Uribe, the Colombian government launched an aggressive campaign against the FARC, which at one time controlled a vast amount of territory in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Uribe’s tactics, some of which were criticized by the Western world, succeeded in weakening the FARC’s leadership, but did not force the group to the negotiating table. President Juan Manuel Santos, who served as Uribe’s Minister of Defense, has taken a more conciliatory line toward the FARC, entering into peace negotiations with the group in November 2012. Those negotiations have borne some fruit, with the FARC declaring a unilateral ceasefire in December and both sides making progress on issues such as land reform and the FARC’s participation in politics. Santos has said that he wants a peace agreement by the end of the year, but issues such as disarming the FARC, compensating victims of the violence, dealing with the human rights abuses that took place during the conflict, and political resistance by right-wing politicians may scuttle a peace deal.
With progress being made toward a lasting solution for Colombia’s war with the FARC, extempers should be prepared to handle questions about the issue for the rest of this season. This topic brief will provide a quick overview of the Colombian conflict, address the pace of negotiations thus far, and then analyze the stumbling blocks that could hinder a lasting peace agreement.
Note: There are other armed groups that are fighting in Colombia such as the National Liberation Army (ELN). This topic brief will primarily focus on the FARC, though, as they are Colombia’s largest left-wing militant group and, unlike the ELN, they are currently negotiating a peace accord with the Colombian government.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
The Colombian-FARC Conflict
Colombia’s conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) began fifty years ago in 1964. The struggle has its roots in the Cold War, where the United States backed anti-communist leaders throughout Latin America. Colombia was no exception to this principle and the country suffered waves of political violence in the 1940s and 1950s when conservative politicians feared the rise of leftist leaders. The FARC was formed in 1964 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party. Its original aim was to protect the country’s rural peasantry from armed units that were tied to the Colombian Army. The group also had the intention of overthrowing the Colombian government and installing a Marxist alternative.
By the 1980s, though, the FARC had fallen well short of this aim. It had not been suppressed by the Colombian government, but it was also failing to move outside of its rural enclaves in the northern and eastern parts of the country. According to The Economist on January 31, the FARC expanded its participation in criminal activities during the 1980s in order to finance its war. The organization engaged in drug-trafficking (namely in cocaine), kidnapping, extortion, and illegal gold mining. The FARC’s reliance on brutal violence against its opponents, as well as its participation in criminal activities, caused the United States and the European Union (EU) to classify it as a terrorist organization. The FARC made some gains in the 1980s, as it expanded its control of territory and flirted with participating in national politics. However, the 1980s and 1990s failed to produce a lasting peace agreement, as several ceasefires took place but then broke down as a result of ongoing violence, especially when drug cartels entered the picture due to the lucrative price of Colombian cocaine.
Further complicating the situation was the presence of right-wing paramilitary forces that operated under the banner of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). These paramilitaries were bankrolled by drug lords to combat the FARC, which posed a threat to their business. In addition, cattle ranchers and oil companies funded right-wing paramilitaries to protect their personal interests against the FARC and other left-wing militants. Paramilitaries were also used to attack labor leaders, thereby creating a disincentive for Colombians to fight for workers’ rights as the nation’s economy engaged in macroeconomic reform at the end of the twentieth century. Conflicts between the FARC and the paramilitaries, or even between some paramilitary organizations, proved devastating for the country and affected millions of people who became caught in the crossfire. The BBC reports on January 15 that left-wing and right-wing forces are complicit in human rights violations in the conflict, participating in large numbers of extrajudicial killings.
As part of its “war on drugs,” the United States launched Plan Colombia in the late 1990s in an effort to help the Colombian government squash the FARC and deal with other drug lords. The New York Times writes on March 9 that the United States has sent the Colombian government $9 billion in aid, but this has failed to settle the conflict or reduce drug smuggling. The United States has also provided training to the Colombian armed forces, which has been criticized by some human rights advocates that allege that the United States is enabling human rights violations. Prior to the war on terrorism, there were fears that Plan Colombia would eventually lead to an increased American military presence in the country, with some commentators in 2000 speculating that it could become America’s second Vietnam.
Aided by the United States, the Colombian government in the late 1990s and early 2000s began a more aggressive campaign to root out the FARC. The government showed less willingness to participate in negotiations or ceasefires and worked to decimate the FARC’s leadership. Alvaro Uribe of the conservative Democratic Center Party was elected president in August 2002 and launched a security plan that he referred to as “democratic security.” This sought to disrupt the FARC’s activities, reduce the nation’s crime rate, and thwart the Colombian drug trade. Uribe’s aggressive actions, while criticized by some European nations, succeeded in reducing the country’s homicide rate and disrupted the FARC’s supply lines (largely through airborne operations with helicopters or fighter planes). Al-Jazeera explains on March 11 that Uribe’s aggressiveness against the FARC between 2002 and 2010 successfully decimated the FARC’s leadership ranks, with air bombings killing several high-ranking FARC leaders and making life very difficult for rebel fighters. Evidence of the success of Uribe’s strategy is found in the The Guardian of March 11 which explains that the FARC’s ranks have shrunk to 6,000 fighters over the last decade. In addition, the government oversaw the demobilization of the AUC in early 2006.
Nevertheless, although Uribe succeeded in weakening the FARC’s strength, his administration arguably could have done more to solve lingering social and economic problems that help the FARC appeal to poorer Colombians. The BBC reveals in its profile of Colombia on January 19 that although the country has substantial oil reserves and mines large amounts of gold, silver, emeralds, platinum, and coal, wealth earned from these activities goes to a small number of people. In addition, Colombians who are of Spanish descent are better off economically than indigenous peoples and urban areas are much more developed than their rural counterparts. Uribe’s opposition to negotiations with the FARC also meant that the war had to go on. He may have been motivated by Sri Lanka’s example, whose government successfully squashed the Tamil Tigers after negotiations failed in May 2009.
Colombia’s constitution barred Uribe from running for a third term (he had successfully had the constitution amended in 2004 that enabled him to run for a second term in 2006). This opened the door for Juan Manuel Santos, Uribe’s Minister of Defense, to run for the presidency. Santos – representing the Social Party of National Unity – was elected in 2010 in a runoff election with 69.1% of the vote. Colombia Reports on March 12 writes that Santos was elected on a platform of continuing Uribe’s security policies against the FARC, which were popular with many Colombians, but shortly into his presidency he changed his mind and began negotiations with the group. These negotiations started in November 2012, with Cuba hosting the talking in Havana. Norway is also serving as a guarantor of the talks, which means that they are helping to oversee both sides to make sure that they follow through with any agreements that are reached. Astute extempers may remember that these negotiations became the core issue of the 2014 Colombian presidential election, with Santos defending ongoing negotiations and conservatives, led by Uribe, opposing them. Uribe’s Democratic Center nominated former Minister of Finance Oscar Ivan Zuluaga as its presidential candidate, and Zuluaga forced Santos into a runoff, where Santos eked out a 50.95%-45% victory after losing the first round of voting by a 29.25%-25.69% margin. Observers deemed Santos’s successful re-election win as a mandate to continue negotiations with the FARC.
The Pace of Negotiations
Although the international press was skeptical of whether the Havana negotiations would bear fruit since past ceasefires merely allowed the FARC to rebuild its ranks and then re-engage in violence, both sides seem to be making steady progress toward a peace deal. The Economist article previously cited notes that over the last two years both sides have agreed to three of the first six points of a peace agenda. These have included promises by the Colombian government to better develop rural areas with healthcare, infrastructure, and education; allow the FARC to participate in national politics; and promises by both sides to halt the country’s drug trade.
The BBC reports that the Colombian government’s side at the negotiations is led by former Vice President Humberto de la Calle, as well as former military and police leaders. FARC’s side is being led by Ivan Marquez, a former member of the FARC secretariat (its governing body), and Romana, who devised the FARC’s kidnapping strategy decades ago. Deutsche Welle reports on February 14 that sixty victims chosen by Colombia’s National University, the Colombian Catholic Church, and the United Nations have taken part in the talks as well in order to press for the rights of victims. This is a relatively new approach toward conflict management, yet international observers hope that giving a voice to the victims of the fifty-year conflict can allow them to receive justice at the negotiating table.
During negotiations there have still been battles between the government and the FARC, but both sides have promised to continue talking despite incidents that take place at home. Also, these recent negotiations have led to a large reduction of violence. Colombia threatened to withdraw from the talks after the FARC kidnapped a high-level general last November, but the general was returned unharmed and the talks continued. The New York Times previously cited notes that reports of violence linked to the war dropped to 1,186 last year from 2,003 such incidents in 2013. The FARC also declared a unilateral ceasefire on December 20. Although President Santos said that he would not engage in a bilateral ceasefire he appears to be heading down that road as The Latin Post reports on March 11 that Colombia has promised to halt bombing raids of FARC territory for a month. This pleases FARC negotiators, who have called several times for the Colombian government to also engage in a ceasefire during the Havana talks. However, The Latin America News Dispatch and Colombia Reports from March 12 argue that the bombing halt is not an admission of a ceasefire, as ground forces still have the authority to raid FARC territory. Still, with the Colombian military’s most effective operations against the FARC taking place from the air, the reluctance of the Colombian government to continue these operations is a ceasefire in all but name. It should be noted, though, that Santos said that he will resume the bombings if the FARC returns to aggressive activity. He has also said that the bombing halt may be continued beyond one month if conditions continue to be quiet on the front lines.
In addition to the bombing halt, both sides have promised to clear landmines from the country. Al Jazeera explains on March 8 that both sides will work with Norwegian People’s Aid to clear battlefields of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other unexploded ordinance. It adds that Colombia is one of the most mined countries in the world, with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC) ranking it second in the world behind Afghanistan for the highest number of children killed or wounded by landmines. MercoPress reveals on March 9 that 11,000 Colombians, including 1,101 children have been killed or wounded by landmines since 1990. The landmines agreement is significant because not only will the Colombian population benefit from the clearing of the mines, but both sides will have to work side-by-side to accomplish the task. When mines are cleared, both sides will be prohibited from wearing uniforms, which is meant to remove any marks of hostility and promote an atmosphere of reconciliation.
The FARC has also tried to change its image in recent years as the talks have progressed. In addition to promises to clamp down on the drug trade, the group is attempting to shed its monstrous international image. The BBC reports on February 12 that the FARC has promised to no longer recruit soldiers that are below the age of seventeen. The FARC had previously been willing to recruit those who were fifteen years of age or older. Although it denies that it has ever used child soldiers, the Colombian government has long challenged this assertion, with the BBC saying that Colombia has claimed to have rescued nearly 6,000 child soldiers over the last fifteen years, 30% of whom were boys and girls between the ages of nine and fifteen. The recruitment change might be the first of many by the FARC to present itself as a legitimate political actor and less as a militant group, but questions linger about how far it will go to separate itself from criminal activities and its quest to cease fighting Colombian authorities.
Difficulties of Securing a Peace Deal
While progress has been made in Havana, several major issues still linger that could complicate the finalization of a peace deal. One of the biggest is how to handle FARC leaders who stand accused of human rights violations. The BBC explains in the January 15 article previously cited that more than 220,000 people have died in the Colombian conflict, 80% of whom were civilians. An estimated seven million people have also been displaced by conflict. Colombia Reports on March 11 writes that 14% of the Colombian population have in some way been victimized by the war, so there is a strong desire by the Colombian people to hold rebel leaders accountable. However, the FARC has thus far refused, according to Colombia Reports on February 23, to have any of its leaders spend time in prison. FARC negotiator Marquez has said that “No peace process in the world has ended with the leaders of the insurgency behind bars.” President Santos has sent signals that he understands the FARC’s concern, but it would be politically untenable for him to grant a general amnesty. Conservative politicians aligned with Uribe, who already dislike the talks, argue that pardoning any FARC leaders for human rights violations would be unconscionable. Also, The Economist points out that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is tasked with going after war criminals and it would likely workaround a Colombian peace deal to put FARC leaders on trial. What also must be considered is that the FARC was not the conflict’s only aggressor, so the Colombian government has to figure out how to handle accusations against former and existing military personnel. Ideas have been floated to hold some type of truth and reconciliation commission, a process pioneered in El Salvador and also used in South Africa after apartheid, which allowed victims to confront their abusers, while also allowing the accused to confess to crimes for lenient treatment. Others have called for a general amnesty for the rank-and-file, with existing leaders facing a tribunal, but questions linger of who will be tried, by whom, and who will select who is put on trial. If Havana negotiators cannot sort this out, a lasting peace agreement may not be reached.
Also complicating a peace deal is the FARC’s refusal to lay down its arms before participating in politics. The Colombian government asserts that if the FARC keep their weapons that it would be counterproductive to peace as democratic politics require the lack of armed groups, which could be used to intimidate voters. The FARC contends that it needs its weapons for safety, arguing that without them their group could be dismantled by the Colombian government. In order for disarmament to take place, another country, possibly Norway, would have to oversee the process. The United Nations or the European Union (EU) may also take a role in the disarmament process, but that assumes that the FARC is convinced that laying down its arms is in its best interest. USA Today reveals on March 6 that Colombia is still a violent place, with paramilitary vigilantes – the remnants of disbanded paramilitary organizations – now running “chop-up” houses in order to dismember those who run afoul of their operations. Critics of the AUC demobilization and disarmament process in 2006 argued that it did not leave enough viable economic prospects for former members. As a result, many became affiliated with drug gangs and other criminal organizations. Therefore, some type of social and economic reintegration must be part of a peace deal for the 6,000 FARC fighters or otherwise disarmament and demobilization will go nowhere.
Finally, Colombian politics could complicate how a peace deal works out. As already stated in this brief, conservative politicians are hostile to the ongoing negotiations with the FARC and Reuters explains on March 11 that Uribe goes to Twitter regularly to blast the FARC. Extempers might say “so what?” After all, Uribe’s Democratic Center did not elect its presidential candidate last year and thus cannot alter the direction of the peace process. While this is true, there are two reasons why President Santos needs to be making an effort to win over conservative politicians. First, he will not be president forever and there is a fear that if a conservative is elected as Colombian president in 2018 that they would work to undo a peace deal with the FARC. In fact, this is a significant anxiety for FARC guerillas and they would view any peace deal not agreed to by conservative political factions as worth very little. The second reason is Santos has vowed to submit the final peace accord to Colombian voters in a referendum. If that referendum encountered significant conservative opposition, it may not pass and thus doom the entire process. To bring conservatives on board Santos has formed the Advisory Commission for Peace, which is meant to bring together ruling and opposition leaders, indigenous leaders, labor activists, and other concerned parties to advise him and make suggestions for a peace deal. Santos has invited Uribe and Zuluaga to participate, but both men have thus far declined. However, former Defense Minister Marta Lucia Ramirez of the Conservative Party has decided to participate. Colombia Reports writes that there is also growing pressure on Uribe and other conservative politicians to join the Commission. If long periods of peace hold as a result of the FARC ceasefire, it may become politically untenable for conservatives to steadfastly oppose the Havana talks. Therefore, the way that Santos can score political points yet also advance his aims for peace may be to ensure that military conflict is limited, thereby allowing Colombian voters to pressure right-wing politicians into accepting a deal with the FARC.
President Santos is reportedly hoping that a deal can be brokered with the FARC by the end of 2015. Getting there would be a monumental achievement, as the sun may finally be setting on more than fifty years of conflict. However, there are still some significant issues to work out before that point can be reached and until both sides can agree on victim’s compensation and the handling of war criminals, and until Santos can ensure conservative support for an agreement, the country will remain mired in conflict, even if that conflict is mostly on paper.