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While concerns about border security have acquired significant attention in the United States and Europe, another border crisis has created upheaval in the Western Hemisphere. Several weeks ago Venezuelan officials closed border crossings with Colombia, citing security concerns and a need to clamp down on smugglers in the area. In addition to closing the border, Venezuela deported 1,000 economic migrants from Colombia and demolished some of their homes. While Colombia argues that Venezuela’s behavior constitutes a gross human rights violation, Venezuelan authorities insist that they have the right to police their own border and that the inability of the Colombian government to share border responsibilities is what has forced it to act.
This topic brief will outline the scope of the recent border closures, explain some of the reasons that Venezuela moved to close the Colombian border, and then analyze how the border closures could affect Venezuela’s politics, as well as future American foreign policy in Latin America.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
The Basics of the Border Crisis
Traditionally, the Venezuelan-Colombian border, which covers 1,376 miles, has been relatively porous. It is not uncommon to see people migrate across the border daily for work and schoolchildren to cross the border to attend school. The BBC writes on August 31 that Colombians near the border have spouses that live in Venezuela and The Miami Herald notes on August 30 that 16% of Venezuelans are of Colombian descent. However, the porous nature of the border has typically created problems for both nations. Criminal gangs have a history of operating in the region, as have smugglers that take advantage of the low prices of consumer goods within Venezuela (see the next section for details of this). Colombia’s long-lasting civil war is another concern along the border, as peoples have fled into Venezuela to escape the conflict and the Colombian government has argued in the past that Venezuelan authorities are sheltering leftist guerillas. In fact, the two nations were nearly driven to war in 2010 when then-Colombian President Alvaro Uribe accused Venezuelan officials of giving safe havens to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).
The recent border crisis was provoked when three Venezuelan army officers were allegedly attacked near the border town of San Antonio. The Guardian reports on August 20 that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro moved quickly after the incident, announcing a border closure on August 19 during a state television program hosted by National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello. Fox News notes on September 6 that these border closures included the shutting down of bridges connecting Norte de Santander with Venezuela’s Tachira state. This is significant because these bridges are the main crossing points along the border. Maduro justified his actions by claiming that too many criminals and smugglers were operating near the border and that Colombia needed to show more positive steps of border enforcement.
In addition to closing the border, Maduro declared a state of emergency in several border provinces, which the BBC says allows Venezuelan security forces and other officials to search homes without a warrant. As part of this process, security forces rounded up and deported more than 1,000 Coombians who it said were residing in the country illegally. The Miami Herald writes that security forces painted houses with a blue R, which denoted that the residents of the dwelling were legal, and other houses with a red D, which denoted their scheduled demolition because the residents were illegal immigrants. According to The Irish Times on September 6, 15,000 additional Colombians have thus far left Venezuela voluntarily, fearing that they will eventually be forced to leave. Many of these migrants have crossed the border into Colombia with whatever possessions they can carry and their presence is forcing the Colombian government to erect makeshift shelters near the border.
Unsurprisingly, Colombia is criticizing Venezuela for the deportations and alleges that Maduro is using them as a scapegoat for his own political problems. The Irish Times writes that Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos is demanding that Venezuela allow border crossings for humanitarian reasons, allow those who have been deported to recover all of their belongings, and respect standard immigration protocols. Santos tried to get the Organization of American States (OAS) to hold a meeting on the border crisis, but Reuters explains on August 31 that Colombia failed to acquire the eighteen votes needed to hold such a meeting of the organization’s thirty-four members. Colombia got seventeen votes for its proposal, but nations that receive fuel assistance from Venezuela voted against the idea and squashed it. Colombia Reports notes on August 30 that the United States has offered to mediate the dispute, but Venezuela rejected the idea out of hand, saying that the United States was “interventionist.” As of the time of this brief, both nations appear to have found a mediator in Uruguay, with The Latin American Herald Tribune writing on September 7 that Uruguyan President Tabare Vazquez is willing to try to broker a solution between the two sides.
Reasons for the Border Crisis
Opponents of the Maduro regime, who are prominent in Western media circles, have been quick to denounce the border spat as a manufactured crisis to distract Venezuelans from their worsening economy and give Maduro’s socialist allies a boost. Venezuela will hold national elections in December and The Washington Post argues on September 1 that if those elections are free and fair that Maduro and his allies are set to lose. A loss would empower Venezuela’s fractured opposition, possibly leading to a demand to hold a recall referendum on Maduro’s presidency. Maduro has already taken steps to clamp down on his opposition by banning some opposition leaders from participating in the poll, working with his allies to redraw some legislative districts, and then using the Supreme Court to appoint leaders for opposition parties. That said, these steps may not protect him as Venezuelans are growing tired of the shortages of consumer goods that they confront on a daily basis due to the nation’s import controls. Al-Jazeera notes on August 27 that the Venezuelan economy is projected to shrink 7% this year, giving significant concern to Maduro’s government that it is running out of people to blame. Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez liked to blame the United States for Venezuela’s economic ills, but that excuse can only last for so long, so Maduro seems to have chosen a new target in Colombia. The International Business Times explains on August 1 that Maduro has accused Colombia of targeting him for assassination, but he has yet to offer proof of his claims. It should also be noted that this is not the first time this year that Maduro has tried to find a new external enemy to direct Venezuelans anger against. The Miami Herald points out that Maduro angered Guyana in May by claiming that Venezuela owned stretches of the Essequibo region, which is where Exxon Mobil had announced a massive oil find. The dispute nearly became an international incident, so Maduro has a habit of picking fights with other nations in Latin America.
While Maduro has a history of creating problems with his neighbors, he does have a legitimate reason to be worried about smugglers. Venezuelan consumer goods are priced well below their market value due to government controls. For example, The Washington Post explains that gasoline sells for a fraction of a cent. In Colombia, gasoline and other goods are priced at their appropriate market value, so this has fueled a contraband market where smugglers acquire goods cheaply in Venezuela and then take them to Colombia to sell for a profit. According to The Wall Street Journal on September 4, 5,000 families are estimated to be selling contraband gasoline near the border. Venezuelan authorities allege, as noted by The Global Post by way of Xinhua on August 31, that their nation lost $3.6 billion last year due to fuel diversion. Authorities also argue that their nation lost 6,000 tons of food last year as a result of smuggling. Maduro blames the smuggling for creating widespread shortages of food and medicine, but it is unclear whether the amount of smuggling is really the primary cause of this. More than likely, Venezuelan price controls are the culprit as the government could deter smuggling by allowing the prices of goods to be set naturally. However, this has the potential of making the goods too expensive for poorer Venezuelans, which are the base of Maduro’s government, so the price controls remain and the smuggling problem has continued.
Nevertheless, the border closings are showing that smuggling has kept many border towns alive. U.S. News and World Report explains on August 26 that residents in Cucuta, Colombia have complained of long gas lines and shortages because they do not have access to smuggled gasoline. There have also been complaints by residents of border towns that they cannot subsist without smuggling activities, so this is forcing Colombian officials to make promises of job training programs to these communities. It is causing hardships for Venezuelans as well, though, as The Wall Street Journal points out that Venezuelans are relying on Colombian smugglers for medicine, cell phones, motorcycle parts and other goods that Venezuela cannot import in sizable quantities. Thus, the effect of the border closing is limiting smuggling activities, but it is imposing hardship on both populations.
Long-Term Implications of the Border Crisis
The border crisis may blow over between Colombia and Venezuela, although at the time of this brief it had yet to be seen whether both nations could agree to sit down and hash out the issue to the other’s satisfaction. Brief meetings on border security have not produced tangible results and it is unclear whether Uruguay can broker a solution. Also, the OAS refusal to mediate the dispute may drag it out longer than is necessary. Regardless of how long it lasts, the border crisis could create complications to solving the Colombian civil war. The Colombian government is trying to broker a lasting peace deal with the FARC, who it has been fighting for more than half a century, but the border crisis may be an unwelcome distraction to those efforts. Furthermore, the border crisis evokes unwelcome memories of the 2010 border dispute that nearly brought both nations to blows. If Colombians believe that the FARC is working with Venezuelan officials, or if they associate the FARC’s left-wing ambitions with that of Venezuela’s socialist government, they may be less likely to support a peace deal. Thus, nationalistic sentiment among the Colombian population could work against a project that Santos is hoping will solidify his political legacy.
The border crisis is putting American foreign policy in the region in an uncomfortable spot as well. The United States has typically supported Colombia as part of a regional campaign against drug lords and it has had several long-lasting disputes with Venezuela. Colombia Reports explains that Venezuela is angry that American officials have accused their Venezuelan counterparts of drug smuggling and links to other illicit activities. However, there are rumors that President Barack Obama wants to lessen some American sanctions on Venezuela, finding a way to achieve a breakthrough with Maduro as he did with the Castro brothers in Cuba. The Washington Post alleges that this desire for better relations is one reason why the U.S. has thus far said that it is merely “concerned” about the ongoing displacement of Colombians from Venezuelan territory, but the longer the dispute lasts makes it more likely that the U.S. will have to take a tougher stand. In doing so it could make it harder for President Obama to reach an understanding with Maduro. On the other hand, though, if the U.S. appears to lag in its support of Colombia, it could do damage to one of its most reliable partnerships in Latin America.
Lastly, the border crisis has the potential to backfire on Maduro. Barron’s explains on September 2 that high economic stress is making Maduro’s moves look more desperate. The Miami Herald points out that 75% of Venezuelans told pollsters that they thought the state of emergency along the border was an overreaction and 77% said that the crackdown was an attempt by Maduro and his allies to distract from growing political and economic problems. The Agence France Presse writes on August 31 that the state of emergency’s provisions that prohibit the use of firearms along the border and the holding of public meetings could strengthen Maduro before the coming elections, but these moves are so transparent with regards to their political impact that Venezuelans can likely read through them. Since a sizable number of Venezuelans are affected by the crisis it is likely to aid in opposition attempts to get them to the polls in December, so the border crackdown may mark the end of Bolivarian socialism.
Extempers should make sure to follow the Colombian-Venezuelan border crisis. It does not get as much attention as the European migrant crisis or the debate over illegal immigration in the U.S., but has significant ramifications for the Colombian peace process, the Venezuelan elections in December, and the direction of U.S. foreign policy in the region. Logic says that this border crisis cannot continue indefinitely, but nothing is ever typical when it comes to Venezuela and its political scene and its foreign policy, so many twists and turns might be in the offing before the end of the year.