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Two weeks ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ended Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Beginning shortly after the September 11 terror attacks, Operation Enduring Freedom produced the fall of the Taliban government, scattered remnants of the al-Qaeda terrorist network, and attempted to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. Operation Freedom’s Sentinel will replace Operation Enduring Freedom, with the United States leading a contingent of 13,000 foreign troops who will continue to provide training and intelligence services to Afghan security forces and support for counterterrorism operations. President Barack Obama has called for a drawdown of all American forces from Afghanistan by 2016, with only 1,000 remaining in a non-combat capacity. However, 2014 was the deadliest year on record in Afghanistan as more than 5,000 Afghan troops and 10,000 civilians were killed. Since the American withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 produced the rise of the Islamic State, opponents of the President’s drawdown plan argue that the same fate could befall Afghanistan, thereby erasing the gains that NATO troops made since 2001. New Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has also expressed hesitation about the withdrawal of more American and foreign troops from Afghan territory, warning last week that a future withdrawal should be based on mutual interests and not rigid timetables.
This topic brief will provide an assessment of Afghanistan’s progress during Operation Enduring Freedom, discuss how President Obama may handle Afghan policy over the next two years, and assess whether Afghanistan will need a sizable international presence beyond 2016.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Operation Enduring Freedom
Since 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom has to be considered a large military success. International forces, largely composed of American troops, struck hard at the Taliban government and forced it from power after it failed to hand over Osama bin Laden following the September 11 attacks. Air strikes by NATO forces also diminished some of the operational capacity of the Taliban in the field and forced it and remnants of the al-Qaeda terror network to relocate over the Pakistani border. Under President Obama, the United States has used drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas against militants, something that the Pakistani government has repeatedly objected to because they deem those strikes as a violation of their national sovereignty.
Critics of Operation Enduring Freedom argue that the United States could have had a larger troop presence in Afghanistan and provided greater security if President George W. Bush had not decided to invade Iraq in March 2003. After assuming office in 2009, President Obama committed more American ground troops in a “surge” to pacify Afghanistan. This sent more than 100,000 troops into Afghanistan and international forces reached their peak in 2011 when 140,000 NATO forces were in the country. After that point, troops were withdrawn incrementally and it appeared before the recent Afghan presidential election that all international forces may leave the country. This was because then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai refused to sign a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that would give international forces legal sanction to continue their operations. Picked to head the Afghan government following the displacement of the Taliban, Karzai grew more distant from Western authorities during his rule and became very critical of American and NATO-led operations within his country. As stated in our topic brief of the U.S.-Afghan BSA last year, Karzai demanded that the United States help him negotiate with the Taliban and restrict its invasion of Afghan homes during operations. The election of Ashraf Ghani as Afghan president following a runoff in June paved the way for the signing of an agreement with the United States, allowing foreign troops to remain in the country to assist in the training of Afghan forces and to provide other forms of security assistance. As of right now, 13,000 international forces remain in Afghanistan, more than 10,000 of which are American.
The Afghan war has carried its fair share of problems. Taliban militancy has not evaporated and some argue that it is actually getting worse. The Brookings Institution explains on January 7 that the Taliban has killed 10,000 Afghan soldiers and police over the last two years. The Los Angeles Times writes on December 29 that Taliban attacks made 2014 the deadliest year in Afghanistan since the 2001 U.S.-led invasion as 10,000 civilians were killed, along with 5,000 Afghan security personnel. There is evidence that the Taliban is growing stronger in rural areas, especially in the South and the East, which are its traditional strongholds since the Taliban enjoys support among the Pashtun tribesmen who live there. The risk for Ghani’s government is that the Taliban solidifies their support in rural areas and thereby makes the Afghan government only an active force in major cities such as Kabul and Bagram. Additionally, Taliban militants continue to find safe havens in Pakistan and the Pakistani government, while showing more resolve to tackle militancy following a massacre of over one hundred children last month in Peshawar, has largely been an obstacle to cracking down on Taliban sanctuaries within its borders. The fight against the Taliban has largely been carried out by Western forces as well. The Economist reports on December 13 that one of the problems of Operation Enduring Freedom is that it took until late 2009 for international forces to begin training the Afghan army. Prior to this, foreign troops led much of the fighting against the Taliban, thereby helping the Taliban portray the Afghan war as a foreign occupation. One of the fears of a quick withdrawal from Afghanistan is that Afghan troops are not ready to fight without assistance, which could produce a situation reminiscent of Iraq last year when the Iraqi military collapsed in the face of aggressive actions by the Islamic State.
Another problem that Operation Enduring Freedom never quite solved was Afghanistan’s opium trade. Afghanistan used to be a major exporter of the world’s vegetables in the 1970s, but prolonged civil conflict and a long drought in the area destroyed this sector of its economy. Afghan farmers soon turned to opium poppy cultivation because opium can be grown in dry, warm climates. Under the Taliban, opium cultivation was suppressed by the central government, but after they fell from power it returned and the Taliban has used the proceeds from it to fund their rebellion. The Express Tribune of Pakistan writes on January 9 that Afghanistan cultivates 93% of the world’s opium and that 80% of the opium produced in Afghanistan is smuggled through Pakistan and Iran to the rest of the world. Iran has had to deal with a surging heroin problem as a result of Afghan opiates, so its government has been willing to cooperate with Afghan, Pakistani, and United Nations authorities to set up border checkpoints to try to reduce opium smuggling. The Christian Science Monitor writes on January 5 that the United States has spent $7 billion trying to suppress the Afghan opium trade but has very little to show for its efforts.
One of the theories behind going into Afghanistan and Iraq under the Bush administration in 2001 and 2003 was that the United States could transform both countries into democracies that could become beacons for others in the Middle East and Central Asia. Unfortunately, trying to transform the politics of both nations has become easier in theory than in practice and The Christian Science Monitor article previously cited explains that Afghan elections over the last decade have been rife with corruption, vote buying, and thuggery. In its presidential election last year, Ghani defeated former Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Abdullah after two rounds, but Abdullah disputed the outcome of the election and refused to concede after a June runoff. After a lengthy investigation, the Afghan Independent Election Commission announced that Ghani was the winner and Ghani then announced a power-sharing agreement with Abdullah that named him Chief Executive Officer. This basically created a national unity government whereby Ghani still holds the title of the presidency, but Abdullah has the ability to recommend cabinet ministers and attend cabinet meetings. Some analysts say that this is the beginning of Afghanistan returning to a system of government where there is a president and a prime minister. Optimists argue that despite the election difficulties last year, the fact that bloodshed was largely avoided was a good sign, as was the fact that power peacefully transferred between democratic governments for the first time in Afghan history. Those who were happy with the election outcome also note that turnout was high, which was a public illustration of defiance against Taliban threats to disrupt the poll. The counter-argument to all of this is that the power sharing agreement between Ghani and Abdullah is just a way to paper over existing tensions, and they point out that both men have yet to agree on who will serve in some of the government’s most powerful ministries, namely those that deal with military affairs and security. There are also concerns that the accord may inhibit strong government action against external threats as Ghani and Abdullah’s allies may spend more time undermining each other. After all, if Afghan democracy fails, does that not serve the Taliban’s aim of showing that democracy is not well-suited for Afghanistan and that its strong leadership is a preferable alternative?
Despite problems, Operation Enduring Freedom did provide enough security so that Afghanistan could start making some gains, notably in education and healthcare. The Brookings Institution’s article previously cited from January 7 explains that Afghan life expectancy has risen from fifty-one in 2001 to sixty-one today. Infant mortality rates have also declined from ninety-three deaths before one year of age per 1,000 live births in 2001 to seventy-two deaths as of 2012. 56% of the Afghan population now enjoys access to clean water, which is 12% higher than 2008 levels and primary school enrollment has also increased seven-fold from a mere 21% in 2001. The Christian Science Monitor adds on January 6 that the invasion of Western forces has been to the benefit of Afghanistan’s female population, who were not allowed to work or leave the home without a male relative under the Taliban. For example, maternal mortality has dropped significantly from 2000 levels when the rate was 49.4%. This decline has occurred because Afghan women have greater access to healthcare and this has also improved their life expectancy, as they now live three years longer than men. Afghan women also enjoy greater education rights, as four million Afghan girls are in school and women are serving as police officers, pilots, and governors. ABC News points out on December 30 that 2,500 Afghan women are serving in the military and that 27% of its parliament is composed of women, larger than Canada, France, and Great Britain (however, it should be noted that this high number of female representation is due to gender quotas written into the Afghan constitution). In addition, although Afghans are cognoscente of lingering security problems and corruption, they still have an optimistic view of their country. Foreign Policy writes on January 5 that when polled by the Asia Foundation, 50% of Afghans believe their country is headed in the right direction, 90% of them respect the army, and 70% respect the police. Also, the government enjoys an approval rating of 60% versus just a mere 10% for the Taliban. This is evidence for how Afghans recognize that their daily lives are improving since Operation Enduring Freedom and shows that they may not embrace a Taliban reconquest as a form of liberation.
President Obama’s Withdrawal Plan
Extempers may remember that President Obama was elected in 2008 on a platform that was highly critical of the war on terrorism. Then-Senator Obama chastised the Bush administration’s lack of cooperation with some of America’s historical allies and was very critical of the Iraq war. One wonders if the economy had not collapsed if John McCain would have been able to defeat Obama since by that time the Iraqi surge had proven to be a significant success. On Afghanistan, though, Obama always saw it as the “right war.” For him, the war there against the Taliban was in direct relation to the attacks on September 11 and the Bush administration harmed American interests when it diverted resources to Iraq instead of the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Learning from the surge in Iraq, President Obama went about implementing a similar strategy in Afghanistan in 2009, although critics of his policy allege that by setting a deadline for when that troop surge would end he undermined his goal of eradicating the Taliban. The U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011 was deemed as a success of President Obama’s new Afghan strategy. As a result, extempers should be careful not to equate President Obama’s vociferous opposition to the Iraq war with his position on Afghanistan. For him, both conflicts are quite different, especially because the Afghan conflict had much more international support than the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.
President Obama does hope that by the time he leaves the White House the American commitment to Afghanistan will be minimal. This reflects his goal of being a “peace president.” Candidate Obama pledged to end America’s commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq and he followed through on his Iraq pledge in 2011, albeit in part because of the Iraqi government’s unwillingness to sign a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that was suitable to American interests. The Washington Times reports on January 8 that President Obama wants the American presence in Afghanistan, which currently numbers 10,800 troops, to be scaled back by 50% by the end of 2015. By the end of 2016, the United States should have what he deems as a “normal embassy presence,” with the goal of having less than 1,000 American troops in the country. As The Hill writes on January 5, the exact role of the remaining forces post-2016 has yet to be determined, but their function could serve as embassy security, helping Afghan forces with counterterrorism operations, or working with Foreign Military Sales to Afghanistan.
In many ways, Afghanistan has been the “forgotten war,” as much of America’s political debate about military operations in the war on terrorism has focused on Iraq. However, there is evidence that more Americans are paying attention to the fighting in Afghanistan and that they may not be too keen on leaving. The Huffington Post reports on January 5 that a recent Washington Post-ABC News poll found that a majority of Americans support the idea of keeping thousands of troops there for the duration of 2015. There has also been a surge of support for those who think that fighting a war in Afghanistan was the right thing to do. As the article goes on to explain, the number of Americans who think that the war “was worth it” has risen to 38%, a 10% increase above July 2013 levels when only 28% of Americans thought that the war in Afghanistan was a good policy decision. According to Reuters on January 5, this increase of support for the war in Afghanistan and more positive opinions about it may be linked to Iraq. Critics of President Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq said that it was based on politics and overrode military considerations. They allege that the President wanted to pull out American troops so he could shore up his base before the 2012 presidential election, thereby leaving Iraq unprepared for an onslaught against Islamic militant groups. Supporters of the President counter that the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki was unwilling to provide legal protection to American troops beyond 2011 and that the SOFA agreed to between the Iraqi government and President George W. Bush called for a withdrawal of American forces at the end of 2011. Regardless of one’s political views, it is clear that the Iraqi government was not prepared to provide for its own security after the American withdrawal, which is why the Islamic State scored such resounding victories over the Iraqi Army last year. Americans who fear the rise of the Islamic State – and President Obama’s difficulty in dealing with them in Iraq and Syria probably contributed to the Democrats losses in the recent midterm elections – may believe that Iraq’s situation could befall Afghanistan if American forces leave. This is a sensitive issue among military families who have had loved ones die or be maimed in Afghanistan and they do not want their sacrifices to have been made in vain. Other critics of an accelerated withdrawal warn that if U.S. forces leave that could imperil other segments of Afghan society, including women. The Christian Science Monitor article previously cited from January 6 reveals that if the Afghan government negotiates with the Taliban, women’s rights may become a casualty. There are troubling signs that the Afghan government is backsliding on women’s rights as well, as there have been eleven government meetings since 2005 that have lacked any female participants and there are signs that women may not play a prominent role in potential peace negotiations.
All of the above concerns make an Afghan withdrawal a potential political minefield for President Obama. Currently, the President has made some adjustments to his withdrawal plans. Reuters explains that the President’s initial plan for the beginning of 2015 called for 9,800 American forces to remain in Afghanistan, but he increased that number by another 1,000 troops back in May. The President has also approved of another exception to American involvement in Afghan security by allowing American troops to intervene to prevent the collapse of Afghan forces when they fight the Taliban. This adjustment was likely made after Iraqi forces disintegrated against the Islamic State last year. This exception dovetails with the other two responsibilities of the remaining American troops in Afghanistan: train the Afghan military and target al-Qaeda militants. The Economist on December 13 also explains that President Obama had to retreat from a previous pledge not to provide air support to Afghan forces in the field last year. The U.S. Air Force will continue to provide this assistance until Afghanistan gets its own air force running, which will take several more years. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is also providing some political cover to President Obama should a large American troop presence be needed beyond 2016. Since the Afghan President is apparently willing to let American forces stay, President Obama could argue that the United States was merely responding to an urgent request from an ally.
Therefore, President Obama still intends to withdraw nearly all of America’s troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2016, but increased Taliban militancy, the weakness of the Afghan National Security Forces, and increasing domestic political opinion to stay the course may cause him to adjust that plan.
Does Afghanistan Need Continued International Assistance?
The big question that extempers will have to confront in future rounds about Afghanistan is whether the country is ready to stand on its own two feet and if it still needs international assistance. The term “international assistance” can also be construed to mean lots of things such as financial aid, military aid, etc. Former President Hamid Karzai seemed much more willing to go it alone by the end of his tenure, but President Ghani, a former World Bank official, is much more open to improving relations with Afghanistan’s neighbors and maintaining ties with the Western world.
In terms of military operations, the Afghan National Security Forces still need Western assistance. The country’s military, as previously noted in this brief, did not start receiving intensive training until 2009 when it became clear that Operation Enduring Freedom would have to begin winding down. Also, the country’s air force is still in development and air superiority against Taliban militants would be an important tool for the government to have. American drone technology has also been effective in eliminating some of the most dangerous militants confronting the country in its eastern region and over the Pakistani border, something that the Afghan government currently lacks. If American forces stay, they will probably have a very limited operational commitment just like the status quo, but their presence could be a source of confidence for Afghan troops. Also, the Brookings Institution reports on December 22 that the U.S. would be wise to try to stay in Afghanistan because the country provides bases for drone strikes against al-Qaeda militants in Central and South Asia and that it is best for America to fight militants in Afghanistan than fight them in other regions. Foreign Policy also explains on January 2 that without Western assistance, the Afghan government may find it difficult to exercise power over the country’s outlying regions. This would cause the Afghan government to lose legitimacy in these parts of the country and provide a base of support to the Taliban to strike at urban areas. It would also be a significant public relations blow to the Afghan government because how much power does a government exercise over its people when its dictates only go as far as a few urban centers?
The only question is how much money the United States is willing to keep shoveling into Afghanistan as The Global Post reports on January 6 that the U.S. has spent close to $700 billion fighting the war in Afghanistan, which makes it the second-most expensive conflict in American history behind the Iraq war’s price tag of $814.6 billion according to Time on January 1. Much of America’s remaining commitment to Afghanistan may depend on how it conceptualizes the threat posed by the Taliban and the Islamic State. As noted earlier in this brief, some fear that the Islamic State may make inroads into Afghanistan after American forces leave. The Global Post on December 31 explains that stories are circulating in Afghanistan that some fundamentalist militants are becoming frustrated at the lack of significant Taliban successes against the Afghan government and see the Islamic State as a source of inspiration. Graffiti in support of the Islamic State has decorated some of the country’s police, military, and government installations over the last few months. However, the article goes on to explain that fears of an Islamic State takeover of Afghanistan after an American withdrawal are overblown. First, the Taliban and the Islamic State would not be natural allies because the Taliban is a nationalist movement. Already Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have gotten into a public relations spat over who the rightful caliph is of the Islamic world. And second, the Taliban is very suspicious of outsiders, even moreso because the last outsider they relied on, Osama bin Laden, caused them to be overthrown in 2001.
If the West were to leave, President Ghani would have to turn to other regional actors for support. Much of the support he would seek would be to get the Taliban to the negotiating table. The Foreign Policy article previously cited from January 2 discusses how Ghani has begun making overtures to China, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for support. The United States already brokered one peace with the Taliban last year when it secured the release of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay. The United States would likely oppose a peace deal with the Taliban that called for rolling back some of the human rights gains in the country, namely regarding women’s rights and democracy. However, with the United States out of the equation the Afghan government could secure whatever peace deal it found to be in its interests. The New York Times on January 3 reveals that 66% of Afghans would favor an amnesty to Taliban fighters if it produced an end to the war, with 62% of Afghan women supporting this provision. The risk of a deal, especially if brokered with Pakistan, is that it may subsume Afghanistan’s interests to its neighbor. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was the mother of the Taliban, which it nurtured and used to take Afghanistan out of India’s orbit. Pakistan’s government fears that after the West leaves and Afghanistan is left on its own that it may broker an alliance with India, thereby encircling parts of Pakistan. If the Afghan government relies on Pakistan to reach a peace with the Taliban, Foreign Policy warns that it may make itself too dependent on its neighbor to keep the Taliban in line, thereby making it a vassal of Pakistan once again.
Economically, it would be best for the Afghan government to have a close relationship with the West. Afghanistan has been the recipient of billions of dollars in Western aid since 2001, with Newsweek reporting on January 2 that the United States has sent $104 billion to the country since 2002, which is more than the United States provided to Europe after the Second World War under the Marshall Plan when figures are adjusted to account for inflation. Unfortunately, much of this aid was sent to combat operations and not much toward reconstruction, but the influx of Western cash has helped the Afghan economy grow significantly over the last decade. The Christian Science Monitor article previously cited from January 5 reveals that the Afghan economy has grown ten times over 2001 levels, but the government is still bringing in less revenue than the opium market. For example, the Afghan government will bring in $1.8 billion this year, but that is still much less than the proceeds that can had from opium, meaning that the Taliban will have potentially more money in its coffers for operations. Less money for the Afghan government also means that it may struggle down the road to pay security personnel such as troops and police, which are vital to ridding the country of the Taliban menace. The government’s best hope is reforming its mining sector as Newsweek reveals that the country is sitting on an estimated $1-$3 trillion in gold, iron, copper, lithium, and rare earth mineral resources. However, the country does not have a good legal or bureaucratic infrastructure in place to preside over this part of the economy and it may take another decade to bring it online. Tapping into these resources is what could wean Afghanistan off of foreign aid, which is still funding large parts of its operations, but African countries such as Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo show how mineral wealth does not always equate to prosperity and can actually fuel conflict. Western donors are also getting somewhat frustrated over corruption in the Afghan government and President Ghani has demanded that the United Nations Development Program give oversight of the Law and Order Trust Fund, which pays for the salaries and pension benefits of Afghan police, over to the Afghan government. International officials are hesitant to do so because, as The New York Times reveals on January 3, the Afghan government has a poor history of tracking funds and eliminating corruption. Ghani says he wants to tackle these problems and that the Law and Order Trust Fund under UN management has too many overhead costs, but he is walking a fine line because if Western donors tire of Afghanistan and some of the political deadlock still existing between Ghani and Abdullah – remember they still have yet to agree on who will staff key security ministries – then Afghanistan may be put in a very poor place financially. This could help the Taliban because an Afghan government that could not pay its bills or support the economy would see its popular support erode and its people, especially young people, turn to more radical alternatives.
Therefore, Afghanistan is going to need the help of the international community for at least another decade whether it be in supporting its economy or providing greater security. Depending on how 2015 goes, America’s commitment may increase beyond what President Obama envisions, especially if 2015 is even deadlier than 2014. The United States does not want an Iraq 2.0 to emerge in Central Asia, but avoiding one may require more aid dollars and a greater commitment than some Americans and future political leaders may be comfortable with in the years ahead. This makes the next few years just as much of a test for Afghan political leaders as their American counterparts because they must show they are making significant progress in solving political disputes, establishing democratic institutions, and engaging in needed reforms. If they fail, Western support may erode and Afghanistan may find itself sliding backward over the next decade rather than building on the gains of its wartime period.