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Last week’s Iranian elections were billed as the most significant in decades as reformist, moderate, and conservative candidates vied for seats in the nation’s parliament (called the Majlis) and its Assembly of Experts, the body that selects the nation’s Supreme Leader. The elections appeared to be a triumph for moderate President Hassan Rouhani, with reformist and moderate candidates sweeping all of the seats in Tehran and returning to the Majlis for the first time since 2012. Moderate candidates also did well in the Assembly of Experts elections, apparently winning fifty-one of the eighty-eight available seats. In a campaign that was marred by accusations of Western interference by the nation’s conservatives, Rouhani successfully rallied Iranians around the benefits of the recent nuclear deal and appears poised to push for more economic and social reforms before Iran holds its presidential election next year. This could make Iran a growing superpower in the Middle East, but extempers should be cautious of reading too much significance into the elections as hardliners continue to control the Islamic Republic’s primary institutions.
This topic brief will provide some background information on Iranian politics, discuss the brief election cycle that led up to the recent elections, and then analyze the significance of the elections.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Background on Iranian Politics
Prior to 1979, Iran was governed by the autocratic Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The Shah was resented by many Iranians because he came to power in 1953 as a result of a CIA and British-inspired coup against his father, Reza Shah. Also, the Shah was an ally of Western powers during the Cold War and had very little tolerance for the religious values of more conservative Iranians. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction against Western cultural values by the late 1970s, along with pressure by U.S. President Jimmy Carter to embrace human rights, weakened the Shah’s position and in December 1979 he was overthrown by a collection of democrats and Islamic leaders. Shortly after the Shah’s overthrow, Iran was proclaimed as an Islamic Republic with conservative theocrats seizing power at the expense of more liberal elements of the revolution. Power was consolidated in the hands of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was named Supreme Leader on December 3, 1979.
Iran’s present government combines elements of a democracy and a theocracy. Iranians get to vote for representatives in the national parliament (the Majlis), the presidency, and for clerics that staff the Assembly of Experts (a body that is tasked with choosing the Supreme Leader). Iran’s Supreme Leader in turn appoints key government offices such as the head of the nation’s judiciary and the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council is arguably one of the most important institutions in the country. It is composed of twelve experts in Islamic law and vets candidates that voters get to choose from in elections, supervises those elections, and interprets the nation’s constitution. This last task is where the Guardian Council can check reform because it can veto legislation that is not in keeping with Islamic law. During the 1990s when reformist elements attempted to liberalize elements of Iranian society, the Guardian Council used this veto several times, thereby halting the spread of more progressive ideas in the country.
Extempers will often see Iranian politics bifurcated into reformist and hardline camps. Reformists are deemed to be those that favor more cooperation with the West, wish to liberalize Iranian society and the nation’s economy, and want to turn the nation into more of a popular democracy. Hardliners are characterized by their hostility to the West, their willingness to strengthen religious police that enforce the Islamic Republic’s adherence to conservative Islamic values, and are suspicious of empowering the population at the expense of various clerics. However, Foreign Affairs writes on February 24 that this assessment is incorrect (Writer’s Note: However, this brief will use the reformist-hardline division due to its simplicity for the purposes of clarity and simplicity). It argues that the real divide in Iranian society today is between conservative forces that wish to go back to the Islamic principles of 1979 and pragmatists that are waging a multi-pronged offensive to thwart conservative aims. Within these two ideological camps are theocrats, which favor religious governance, and republicans, which favor representative government. Foreign Affairs explains that pragmatic theocrats, such as current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (who has ruled Iran since June 4, 1989) are willing to open the Iranian economy, but they wish for Islamic values to persist in society and have a more anti-Western orientation on foreign policy. Radical theocrats, who can be characterized as occupying the far right of the Iranian political spectrum, prefer to have a large state presence in the economy and want a more aggressive, confrontational policy with the West. Pragmatic republicans, of which President Rouhani is one, favor the power of elected institutions over religious ones, wish for the state to aid industrialization, and wish to integrate Iran with the global economy. All of this necessitates a less hostile attitude toward the West. However, radical republicans go even further than this and want to overturn the power of the Guardian Council and other religious bodies in favor of the democratic element of the Iranian political system. They favor limiting the powers of the Supreme Leader and they prefer to move away from conservative social policies. It is the radical republicans that staged the Green Movement in 2009 that protested the outcome of a presidential election that awarded a second term to hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Ahmadinejad straddled the pragmatic theocratic and radical theocratic camps).
The recent elections illustrated a divide among these various ideological camps. In 2013 centrist candidate Hassan Rouhani won the Iranian presidential election in the first round, capturing 50.9% of the popular vote. The Los Angeles Times explains on February 28 that Rouhani promised voters improved ties with the West, resolving international problems created by Ahmadinejad’s regime concerning Iran’s nuclear program, and economic and social liberalization. He also promised to push for the release of major political prisoners such as former presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi. Rouhani’s presidency has been mixed thus far. As a former nuclear negotiator he did achieve a deal over Iran’s nuclear program, which provides the Islamic Republic with gradual sanctions relief from the United Nations, European Union (EU), and the United States. However, former supporters allege that Rouhani could do more beyond securing closer ties with the West. The Christian Science Monitor reports on February 16 that moderates think Rouhani takes their support for granted because they have nowhere to turn and a recent analysis showed that Rouhani has only achieved 15% of his campaign promises. With Rouhani likely seeking re-election next year the upcoming elections were deemed as a referendum on his leadership, as well as his outreach to the West. Conservative hardliners have mixed feelings on the nuclear accord, with some welcoming the sanctions relief, but others not wanting a complete resolution of ties with the United States. As such, conservatives hoped to weaken Rouhani’s position in the recent elections so that they could have a better chance at stopping his moderate reforms this year and into the next election cycle.
The Election Cycle
In what would be a welcome relief to American voters, the Iranian election cycle lasted only a week. Moderates and reformists hoped to capitalize on discontent among Iranian youth, who suffer from joblessness and underemployment. This is a sizable voting bloc in Iran, with The Christian Science Monitor noting on February 25 that two-thirds of the Iranian population is under the age of thirty-five. That article also highlights how young people have driven significant changes in Iran’s political system in the past, having supported the 1979 revolution, the reformist drive of the 1990s, and the Green Movement of 2009. Reformists sought to re-engage in the nation’s political process after boycotting 2012 parliamentary elections. This merely allowed conservatives to strengthen their power, though, so reformists presented more than 3,000 candidates for the Majlis and the Assembly of Experts. However, the conservative Guardian Council quickly flexed its muscle, with The Christian Science Monitor reporting on January 22 that it disqualified 99% of reformist candidates. Even Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first Supreme Leader, was disqualified for lacking the credentials necessary to sit in the Assembly of Experts (Hassan has aligned himself with reformists). Eventually, 1,500 candidates were reinstated on appeal, but the disqualifications affected reform forces more than any other faction.
Aside from disqualifying candidates, election officials made it very difficult for reformists and moderates to court voters. Since the 2009 Green Revolution, Iranian conservatives, whether pragmatic or radical, have become very concerned about popular protest. Time explains on February 25 that these concerns prompted police in the capital city of Tehran to ban street meetings. Pro-Rouhani and other moderate rallies were also poorly attended, possibly due to concerns that people had about monitoring by security forces. However, this did not thwart republican factions, who turned to social media to rally voters and communicate their message. Time goes on to explain that politicians used the encrypted messaging application Telegram, one of the social media networks that the Iranian government has not censored, in order to campaign.
Conservatives charged that the pro-Rouhani campaign was funded by outside interests, notably the United States and Great Britain. Anti-British sentiment is popular in Iran due to the legacies of colonialism, but Rouhani and moderates disavowed any implicit cooperation with Western powers. Additionally, conservatives attempted to break apart the opposition by noting that some of its allies were unwilling to completely affiliate with its campaign. Time writes that some hardliners ran on a reformist list of candidates in the election as part of an opposition efforts to control more seats in the Assembly of Experts. Fearing that this could endanger their lives or careers some of these hardliners attempted to mask the fact that they were placed on a reformist electoral list, thereby drawing criticism from conservative factions.
Like the United States, Iranian reformers tend to do better when turnout is high. That appears to have happened in this election as The Financial Times of London explains on February 28 that early projections show that 60% of all eligible voters turned out last week. Turnout was so high that the BBC reports on February 28 that voting times had to be extended three times on Friday. Reformist and moderate candidates did very well in Tehran, sweeping all thirty parliamentary seats in the city. It was still unclear at the time of this brief whether reformist politicians did well in rural areas, a traditional bastion of Iranian conservatism, but the elections did their job in restoring reformist and republican interests to the Majlis. In addition, in Assembly of Experts elections it appears that reformists and moderates won a majority, with the republican People’s Experts list of former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani winning twenty-nine seats and Rouhani’s Friends of Moderation List winning twenty-two seats. The Guardian writes on February 28 that the Experts elections dealt a significant blow to hardliners and theocrats, with Mohammad Yazdi, Taqi Mesbha-Yazdi, and Ahmad Jannati, losing seats. All three men were senior clerics that were deemed as possible successors to Khamenei.
The Significance of the Elections
When extempers are asked about the recent Iranian elections they will probably be asked about the significance (or lack thereof) of the result. First, extempers should realize that the elections do not change Iran’s theocratic model. Yes, reformists made significant gains in the national parliament, appearing to win at least a plurality of the seats (although not enough to govern independently). This should strengthen Rouhani’s hand to press for more economic and social reforms as he cast the election as a referendum on his leadership. However, U.S. News & World Report warns on February 23 that it is not as if reformists have not made significant legislative gains in the past only to have their momentum squashed by conservative interests. It explains that in the 1990s Iran had a reformist president in Mohammad Khatami, who pressed for a more liberal country, media, and open economy, but the Guardian Council squelched some of his major legislative packages. In addition, conservatives launched a fierce counterattack when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency in 2005 and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, a very conservative branch of its armed forces, acquired significant political and economic power. In order for Rouhani to capitalize on his electoral gains he is going to have to navigate this system, but the problem is that he and Khamenei are unlikely to agree on the path that Iran should take. Khamenei does agree that some economic liberalization is needed, but U.S. News & World Report highlights how Khamenei is unlikely to support normalizing relations with the United States, freeing up Iran’s electoral rules to allow more democratic candidates to run, and easing social repression of dissidents.
Economists note that even as Western sanctions are being lifted Iran’s economy needs significant structural reform. The reason that reformist candidates such as Rouhani tend to win free elections is because the youth vote is so significant and CNN explains on February 28 that economic concerns drive this block of voters. The Economist writes on February 27 that even some of Iran’s holiest cities such as Mashhad are desiring greater economic liberalization in order to secure greater foreign investment, new railways, highways, and even leisure centers. To do this, though, Rouhani will have to fight with entrenched interests that benefited from previous sanctions. During the last decade several influential Iranians, and elements of the Revolutionary Guards, have come to control different commercial sectors of the Iranian economy. These institutions are inefficient and would not withstand the onslaught of free competition with Western businesses. The BBC explains on February 24 that Iran needs to confront this cronyism in order to rescue itself from a serious recession, but it is unclear whether Khamenei will allow such liberal reforms to be enacted. If he thwarts them, Rouhani will be powerless to fix some of the Iranian economy’s problems and he will have a difficult time showing voters that he deserves a second term next year.
Arguably the most significant outcome of the election was the rise of moderate factions in the Assembly of Experts. There have been rumors that Khamenei, who is seventy-six years old, is not in good health (some Western observers think he could have prostate cancer) and this could mean that within the next eight years the Assembly of Experts could choose his replacement. Now that more moderate factions appear to be in control of the body that could give them the power to name a progressive individual to the post. The UK Independent writes on February 28 that this could radically alter the country since the Supreme Leader appoints half of the Guardian Council, has the power to push for more free elections, is in charge of the nation’s military, and could press for new constitutional reforms. The Malaysia Star explains on February 25 that the main aim of reform-minded politicians in the Assembly of Experts will be to block a conservative choice for the post if it becomes available, something will be likely since Khamenei will be eighty-four in 2024 the next time elections are held. Thus, it may not matter if moderates have enough seats in the Majlis because they could have major leverage in choosing the next Supreme Leader.
The Iranian elections did not receive a great deal of international press coverage, likely due to the short nature of the campaign and how oil prices, the U.S. presidential election, the Syrian Civil War, and the European migrant crisis continue to dominate the news. However, the elections have given Rouhani and reformists a sizable boost in terms of political leverage. Yes, they do not control more conservative institutions such as the post of Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, or the nation’s military, but they do have valuable representation in the Majlis and the Assembly of Experts to gradually reorient Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. While it is unlikely that Rouhani will be able to make major changes over the next year and a half before the next Iranian presidential election, the showing of reform candidates illustrates that he has popular support, and that may be a tool that he can use to show Khamenei and other conservatives that gradual change is more preferable than risking larger discontent in the future.